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I. Introduction  
The simple outcome of Miller 2
1
 is that the Executive lost, and Parliament returned to work. 
However, the impact of the judgment on the UK constitutional principles of relative separation 
of powers and judicial activism is arguably far reaching has led scholars to debate at length the 
Supreme Court’s decision.  
On the one hand, Loughlin
2
 views the decision as politically motivated, while on the other, 
Elliot
3
 views the decision as upholding the basic constitutional principles. I agree with Elliot that 
the Supreme Court’s decision is in line with the basic principles of the UK uncodified 
constitution. I will cover five relevant constitutional principles that support Elliot’s view: 
separation of powers, Parliamentary sovereignty, Bill of Rights, justiciability and rule of law. 
Before concluding, I shall highlight areas where the SC decision could have been drafted better 
for both Whitehall and Westminster.   
II. Separation of Powers  
The Supreme Court did not shy away from discussing
4
 the constitutional principle of the 
separation of powers, stating: “Under the separation of powers, it is the functions of the courts 
to determine them.” This establishes the judiciary authority in defining the separation of 
powers.  
The SC had set a specific two step test
5
, which we could name the Miller 2 test. The 
prorogation is unlawful if it is without reasonable justification which frustrates Parliament’s 
ability to carry out its constitutional functions. If we break the test into two parts, the frustration 
part is undisputable, however, the justification or lack of it is. The standard applied to this case 
is that if “…there was any reason - let alone a good reason - to advise Her Majesty to prorogue 




 September until 14
th
 October… It follows that the 
decision was unlawful.
6”  
This leads us to the next level of analysis, which is: does the Executive require a justification? Is 
it the judiciary’s constitutional role to question the Prime Minister’ reasons for prorogation? 
While I appreciate Loughlin’s argument on the politics of Miller 2, I wish to emphasise the SC 
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description: “This was not a normal prorogation.7” The prorogation would have stopped the 
elected MPs from debating Brexit, a topic that was the main British news headline until 
coronavirus started in February 2020. As Bagehot
8
 puts it, an Executive that is free on matters 
its ruling classes will not hear about is the ‘most dull’ government.  
McHarg
9
 claims that the SC has failed to recognise the fusion between the Executive and 
Parliament. This is what Bagehot famously referred to as the ‘efficient secret’ of the 
constitution. The failure of fusion in Miller 2 could have arguably been caused by the polarity 
of both the Executive and a divided Parliament on Brexit. There was arguably no fusion in this 
case and the third side of the UK power triangle needed to act.  
Bagehot
10
 uses an interesting expression when he says: “The mode in which the regulating 
wheel of our constitution produces its effect is plain”. If the UK constitution is a wheel, who 
would sit in the centre of the wheel after Miller 2? I would say none of the three powers.  
Leyland
11
 argues that the British Government is formed from within Parliament. This makes 
the separation of powers between the Executive and Parliament a theoretical concept. 
However, this depends if there is a majority government. I am inclined to agree with Leyland 
that the UK version of the separation of powers is “an untidy concept.12” Unlike the USA 
constitution that is prescriptive on what needs to be done, by who and how, the UK 
constitution is somehow relatively vague.  
The decision of Miller 2 could be seen as a message not only to the Executive but also to MPs. 
The message could be interpreted as: if you don’t act within the powers granted by the law, the 
judiciary will intervene in separating the powers. However, judicial review is not self-initiated, as 
in other jurisdictions, and a member of the public needs to make an application for it to 
happen. This in turn means that the UK judiciary review will always be reactive rather than 
proactive.  Similarly, Parliament legislation could also be seen as reactive as it usually looks to 
the Executive to initiate bills for it to consider. Some academics such as Lord Bryce argued that 
the decline of the legislature is due to the effects of the party and its influence.
13
 However, The 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 helped reinforce the separation of powers and post 2009 the 
SC judges no longer have the right to sit in the House of Lords.
14
 Thus, separation of powers’ 
public law reform is happening but at a slow rate.  
III. Parliamentary Sovereignty      
The second principle is Parliamentary sovereignty, which opponents of the SC ruling argue it 
has been undermined by Miller 2. Loughlin argues that the SC has engaged in a hypothetical 
analysis in order to justify extending its power to constraining the prerogative power by 
reference to the sovereignty principle. The SC analysis is not hypothetical because if Parliament 
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 provides some clarification on the court’s application of the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. Lord Steyn states Dicey’s concept of pure and absolute supremacy 
of Parliament is now out of place
16
, however, he maintains that Parliamentary sovereignty is still 
the general principle of the UK constitution. He then makes a bold statement that the judges 
created this principle. This statement indicates growth in judicially developed common law 
constitutionalism.  Lord Hope
17
 uses the term ‘qualified’ supremacy of Parliament. Both Lords 
statements reflect the current position of the sovereignty being qualified and not absolute. 
Miller 2 further confirmed this position. However, could the Parliament ignore the PM 
prorogation, without the Miller 2 judgment? If the Parliament is absolutely sovereign, could it 
resist the Executive decision without an Act? The answer is no, as the UK has a system of 
balance and checks between the three powers.  
Caird
18
 analysis shows that the Westminster view of the UK absolute Parliamentary sovereignty 
has been reinforced by the SC judgment. He predicts this may not be the case in the future if 
there is to be a majority government which in turn would reduce the centrality of Parliament 
and potentially ignite ‘constitutional injustice’. This refers back to the idea of ‘elective 
dictatorship’ raised by Lord Hailsham in 1976. Elective dictatorship refers to Executive 
dominance which happens when Parliament is dominated by the Executive. This makes it 
arguably easier for the Executive to push its own agenda on the legislator.  
In Miller 2, the SC confirmed Parliamentary Sovereignty by leaving it to the Speaker of the 
House of Commons and the Lord Speaker to take the next steps to meet and follow the 
Court’s ruling. It further emphasized that it is not for the Court to get involved in this 
proceeding of Parliament. This makes one assume the Court wanted to adhere to the orthodox 
view of Dicey that Parliament is sovereign, and no one is above the law, including the Prime 
Minister.  
I tend to agree with Young that it is better to describe “whatever the Queen-in-Parliament 
enacts as a statute is law”19 as a component of the rule of recognition rather than a rule of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. The rule of recognition concept by Hart is observing the legal 
system officials’ actions. Building on this view, Young establishes that both the legislature and 
the courts share sovereignty in relation to constitutive rules and neither has ultimate power. 
This type of analysis places more emphasis on constitutive rules that are not solely in the hands 
of the Parliament. This counters Loughlin’s argument that the Parliamentary Supremacy has 
been undermined by Miller 2 decision because the constitutive rules need both the courts and 
the Parliament. Furthermore, Tierney
20
 makes the point that Parliament could have 
constrained the power of the Executive to prorogue Parliament through legislation. I think this 
argument is theoretical and goes back to the essence of the UK Parliament representing the 
Executive and the whip system which would possibly stop legislation against the PM’s declared 
ideas.   
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IV. Bill of Rights  
Turning to the third argument against the SC’s decision which is the alleged violation of the Bill 
of Rights of 1689. The Bill established the supremacy of Parliament over that of the Kings.
21
 
Similarly, in 1215 Magna Carta was drawn up to put limits on the royal power. From the case 
of Proclamations,
22
 we can see that the limits of prerogative powers have been debated since 
1610. The essence of the case is the King has no prerogative, but that which the law of the land 
allows him. This counters Loughlin’s argument in which he believes that the SC has unsettled 
the principle of granting Royal Assent being equivalent to a proceeding in Parliament and that a 
Court is obliged to accept the authority of Parliamentary Acts. Loughlin’s argument here weighs 
on the Royal Assent which, according to Bingham,
23
 is now a mere formality. The second 
aspect of the argument is also flawed as the SC didn’t reject Parliamentary authority but rather 
reinforced it.   
Finnis
24
 quotes Article 9 of the Bill of Rights: “Proceedings in Parliament ought not to be 
impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament”. It can’t be claimed that the 
decision to prorogue Parliament was made in Parliament. The argument that the Crown’s 
actions in Parliament are proceedings in Parliament need to be taken in context. The Crown 
provides a source of prerogative power, but is the Prime Minister the Crown? More 
importantly, if we focus on the wording ‘Place out of Parliament’ in Article 9, we will find that 
this also includes the Executive and not just the courts. Accordingly, Finnis has selected part of 
Article 9 and ignored an important part of the article in reaching his conclusion.  
V. Justiciability v Juristocracy  
Turning to the principle of justiciability, Miller 2
25
 raises the question of what are the limits of 
justiciability under the UK constitution? Loughlin argues that prorogation is not justiciable. In 
Cherry,
26
 the Court made a link between the sovereignty of Parliament, the accountability of the 
Executive and the rule of law to reach a decision. It is arguable that the power to prorogue is 
justiciable and if it was not that would be against the rule of law. This is because the judiciary 
has a constitutional power to review if the power to prorogue is being used properly. As the 
government could not show why it wanted to prorogue Parliament, this equated to stopping 
Parliament from holding the Executive to account.  
One of the arguments of Finnis
27
is a convention is non-justiciable while law is. The counter 
argument to this what if the convention has not been tested in the past where it neared an area 
of law. However, I do agree with Finnis that the Court didn’t provide a legal time limit to the 
period of prorogation. Perhaps the SC wanted to leave this to Parliament to decide or legislate. 
Another possible reason is defining a maximum prorogation period may go against the fluidity 
of the UK constitution.  
Further to scholar’s view on constitutionalism ensuring that government’s power is legally 
limited, Alberts
28
 argues that this helps make democracy work. The action of the judges can be 
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justified as not only helping democracy work but ensuring it is not overtaken by the Executive. 
This applies to Miller 2 as it stopped the MP from proroguing Parliament.   
The SC referred to Entick v Carrington
29, in which the judgment states: “it was reserved for the 
honour of this Court, which has ever been the protector of the liberty and property of the 
subject.
30” This ruling demonstrates that judicial activism existed as far as 1765 where the judges 
wanted to end and did end the warrants granted by the Secretary of State.  
An alternative view to this is that we are experiencing ‘Juristocracy’, as described by scholars as 
the growth of judicial powers. However, we need to acknowledge that this judicially developed 
‘common law constitutionalism’ falls under the substantive approach of the rule of law which is 
the next principle to analyse.  
VI. Substantive Rule of Law & Accountability to Parliament  
Turning to the fifth principle; accountability to Parliament, McHarg
31
 believes that the SC has 
sided with Parliament against the Crown and used ‘considerable creativity’ in acting as the 
guardian of constitutional values. However, I think we need to bear in mind that Parliament 
may not be viewed by the public as its guardian. In 2009, a poll found that only one in five 
people trust MPs to tell the truth.
32
  
On the other hand, Monaghan
33
 argues that the decision of the SC could be viewed as one that 
protects the principle of Parliamentary accountability which underpins the political 
constitution. This is particularly important when we consider the rule of law basic principle that 
no one is above the law. As Hobbes said long time ago, on every point, there must be a 
supreme authority.
34
 Unlike the American system, where the President can veto a law, he does 
not like,
35
 the Prime Minister does not have such powers. Only Parliament can repeal an act. 
However, when the Prime Minister tried to prorogue the Parliament, he was in a way vetoing it 
from passing new bills.  
It is important to ask whom do the Members of Parliament represent; the public or the party? 
This leads to concluding that the dispute, in Miller 2, is not between Parliament and the 
Executive, nor Parliament and Judiciary, but rather between the Executive and the Judiciary.  
Monaghan
36
 uses a valid analogy in seeing the prerogative as Latin, by which he means no new 
powers can be created. This explains the limits of power of prorogation whether it is under or 
over inclusive. In Entick v Carrington, it was said at the end of the judgment “tyranny is better 
than anarchy, and the worst Government better than none at all.
37” The second part of the 
sentence applies hundreds of years later to collapsed states that we have seen in recent times in 
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VII. Improvement to the Judgment  
There are areas in the judgment that could arguably have been worded better to allow both 
Whitehall and Westminster views to be more aligned, if possible.  
The SC reasoning shows some contradictions. On the one hand, the SC
38
 stated it is aware of 
the importance of having the Prime Minister pressurise the European Council to agree a deal 
by showing a no deal is an option for which he didn’t want Parliament to stop him. On the 
other hand, the Court says there was no reason for him to prorogue Parliament for five weeks.
39
 
The PM was applying the Game Theory in his negotiations and to say there is no reasonable 
justification for the prorogation is not entirely true.  
The SC decision did qualify the judgment by using the words ‘without reasonable justification.’ 
This leaves the door open for potentially not taking the same decision if the Executive had 
given a ‘reasonable justification’ as to why it wanted to prorogue Parliament. This could be 
interpreted as going beyond reviewing the exercise of law and judges exceeding their 
constitutional powers.  
Finnis
40
 suggests that the next Parliament may reverse the SC judgment by exercising its law-
making authority. I believe this would create a standoff between the Judiciary and Parliament. 
Two wrongs do not make right, and if the SC was wrong in its judgment, the answer is not to 
reverse its ruling. While the judgment is not perfect, it is important to respect it to maintain rule 
of law and in turn democracy.  
VIII. Conclusion 
I concur with Descartes, as quoted by Bagehot, that intense self-examination and reason would 
progress everything.
41
 Perhaps the intense scrutiny by the Supreme Court is in line with 
Descartes’ philosophy and not entirely political.  
The decision of the Court is significant and will be debated for years to come. However, it is 
important to remember that the judiciary decision only stopped the prorogation and didn’t stop 
the Executive from achieving its Brexit strategy. The margins of the separation of powers allow 
each of the Executive, the Judiciary and Parliament to have relative independence and power 
within areas that are solely within their jurisdictions.  
Miller 2 reinforced the rule of law and that no one is above the law. The decision should have 
influenced the Executive’s appetite for exceeding its powers, however, the sweeping powers 
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